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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the ways in which the 20th century was dominated by the presence 
of nuclear weapons, by showcasing the major focal points in a chronological sequence. The 
examination reveals the ways in which nuclear weapons changed the world and provides us with 
concrete examples of the tragedy that surrounds their use, the damaging results of experimental 
tests, and the ways in which it can quickly escalate into war. Recalling these concrete examples 
is critical when examining current international affairs. 
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Introduction  
 
The period between 1945 and 1991 is labeled the Cold War due to tensions between the 
two super powers — the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
These two states developed and possessed nuclear weapons; a weapon so destructive it was 
unthinkable just a few decades prior to its invention. The time period was fraught with fears of 
nuclear war between the two superpowers; nuclear fall-out shelters were built, bomb drills were 
often present in schools, and numerous contingency plans were put in place for this specific 
scenario.  
The two super powers, and their allies, built up nuclear arsenals large enough to destroy 
the planet. However, when the USSR fell in 1991, the fear of nuclear war began to dissipate. The 
world attention turned towards the democratization of the former USSR states, the violent 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, turmoil in the Middle East, and stabilizing the economy after such 
a dramatic shift. As the world moved into the 21st century the United States was attacked by a 
radical Islamic terrorist organization in the deadliest attack on US soil in history. Since then 
terrorism has been the main focal point of concern and unease.  The world, at large, turned away 
from nuclear weapons and towards these new threats.  
But despite this shift from Cold War tensions to the upsurge of terrorism, nuclear 
weapons are still present and their threat is just as real. While only five states possessed nuclear 
weapons during the Cold War there are now nine states with nuclear weapons — USA, Russia, 
United Kingdom, France, China,  Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea. For this reason it is 
imperative that we look back on the Cold War to show us what did happen and what could have 
happened. This paper aims to showcase this past so that we can avoid a future nuclear 
catastrophe.
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Chapter 1: Nuclear Weapons and their Origins 
 
Mechanical Basis of Nuclear Weapons 
An atom is the basic structure of any element; it is the combination of a central nucleus 
and orbiting positive-charged particles, called protons, and neutrally charged particles, called 
neutrons. Negatively charged particles, called electrons, orbit the nucleus. The movement of 
electrons within an atom are the cause of atoms emitting energy – the electromagnetic spectrum.1 
The power of a nuclear weapon derives from artificially changing the structure of an 
atoms nucleus. Nuclear power either splits an atom’s nucleus to create two new lighter atoms or 
it combines two atom’s nuclei to form a new heavier atom. The splitting of an atom is called 
fission; it is rare in nature, however once the mechanism is discovered it takes relatively little 
energy to induce the process.2 Fission can cause an atom’s neutrons to fly outwards, when this 
happens a nuclear chain reaction can be achieved, this is necessary for a fission weapon to work.3 
To create the chain reaction a heavy element is required to fling out more neutrons that will 
continue to split other nuclei; for this reason Uranium, the heaviest natural element, is used as the 
mechanism for any nuclear chain reactions. The combining of atoms is called fusion; it is 
abundant in nature, it is mechanism that fuels stars. To reproduce this mechanisms artificially, an 
incredible amount of energy and heat is required to overcome atoms natural repulsion of each 
other.4 The power of a fusion weapon is derived by causing one fusion reaction that will then set 
off a second fusion reaction.5  
Foundations for a Weapon   
The concept of nuclear fission as a feasible energy source was first proposed by physicist 
Leo Szilard in 1933.6 He believed that the energy process being researched could produce an 
atomic energy chain reaction7 the atomic energy created would be able to fuel the world’s 
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systems and end the need for coal and oil;8 the first ideas of nuclear power had a peaceful 
mindset. In that same year another scientist, Ernest Rutherford, working in the field of nuclear 
physics declared that in the present moment, they did not have enough knowledge on the subject 
nor the technology at the time, to use atomic energy. Rutherford was correct; at the time he 
expressed this sentiment the scientific community did not have the necessary knowledge to use 
atomic energy.9  
That knowledge and technology would quickly develop in only 6 years time. Scientists 
Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman successfully split the nucleus of the Radium atom, producing a 
Barium atom in 1938.10 This discovery lead to rapid research in the field and ultimately resulted 
in the race to discover the process to divide heavier atoms and create the nuclear chain reaction. 
Scientists quickly realized that energy like this could be used for more than just peaceful 
means. Leo Szilard, a proponent of atomic energy for a power source, proposed scientists’ self 
censorship for fear of giving away information that could result in weapons controlled by Nazi 
Germany,11 his proposal was mostly successful within the scientific community. Despite early 
thoughts of peaceful use it became apparent to scientists that during war time this energy could 
be developed into a weapon. The research on fission had already be successful now it was a 
matter of weaponizing it before the enemy did. This starts the story of a weapon that would come 
to dominate the rest of the 20th Century’s world relations.
End Notes Chapter 1 
 
1 R. Everett Langford, Introduction to Weapons of Mass Destruction: Radiological, Chemical, and 
Biological, (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2004) 
 
2 LibreTexts, “Nuclear Fission vs. Nuclear Fusion,” University of California Davis, Last Updated July 25, 
29. 
https://chem.libretexts.org/Core/Physical_and_Theoretical_Chemistry/Nuclear_Chemistry/Nuclear_Fissio
n_vs._Nuclear_Fusion 
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Chapter 2: World War II  
 
The Race to Make a Nuclear Bomb 
In 1939, one year after the first successful split of an atom, Albert Einstein, at the behest 
of Leo Szilard,1 wrote a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt explaining the concept of a 
nuclear fission bomb.2 He urged the President to being work on such a project due to his belief 
that the Germans were beginning their own research on the matter.3 After all, the first successful 
experiment of fission had taken place in Germany. In the same year, Werner Heisenberg had 
come to the same conclusion about a weapon and offered the idea to a German audience in 
Berlin. In January of 1940, the United Kingdom became the first country to start research on an 
actual weapon,4 not simply fission and nuclear physics alone. Otto Frisch and Rudolph Peierls, 
now refuges from Germany, became research for this idea under the United Kingdom’s (UK) 
MAUD Committee.5 
In the United States of America (US), President Roosevelt received the letter from 
Einstein but was cautious with his response to such an idea,6 but in October of 1939 he gave his 
approval to begin Uranium research7 under the oversight of the Committee on Uranium. Due to 
this hesitancy, by early 1940 only 6,000 dollars in funds had been approved for the research.8 
The research was underway at the University of Columbia in New York City9 by Leo Szilard and 
Enrico Fermi.10 They worked for the “Metallurgical Laboratory”, a fake name to avoid spies.11 In 
1941 in a briefing, Frisch and Peierls described in detail the power that a nuclear bomb could 
explode. This prompted Winston Churchill and others to speed up the research.12 To further 
research the potentiality of a bomb, the scientists first needed to build a nuclear reactor which 
needed a much larger space that New Your City. The Project was moved to the University of 
Chicago13 under a new name, “The Manhattan Project”.   
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The Manhattan Project  
The Manhattan Project began when J. Robert Oppenheimer, a professor from University 
of California, Berkley was designated head of the project’s operation. The project was located in 
three areas: Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Los Almos, New Mexico; and Hanford, Washington.14 The 
construction of its research, tests sites, living facilities, and the roads to these locations came 
under the directive of the US Army Corps of Engineers; the Army was not interested in the idea 
and kept putting off getting the sites, such as Oak Ridge Tennessee.15  The project came in full 
force when Army General Leslie Groves took charge; scientists resisted him as well as the Army 
as they did not want to be ‘put into uniform’ as scientists during World War I were forced to do. 
However, Groves took quick control with the right to order materials and the purchase of the 
Tennessee property16 the project became well equip to fully being its research. The Manhattan 
Project would cost over 2 billion 1943 dollars17 and attracted large numbers of American and 
European scientists including Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, Otto Frisch, and Rudolph Peierls.18 
 The US first successful nuclear tests happened on July 16, 1945, in the New Mexico 
Desert near Alamogordo. The bomb named Trinity was dropped from a steel tower and yielded a 
power equivalent of 21 kilotons of TNT.19 The scientists stood at a distance of 20 miles to view 
the test, which professors Paul P. Craig and John A. Jungermant call “lucky,” due to it being just 
outside the range of burns and permanent eye damage; they also explain that once the mushroom 
cloud formed, the scientists, knowing the effects of the bomb, quickly left to avoid health 
effects.20 
The Potsdam Conference  
At the end of World War II in the European Theater the so-called “Big Three,” leaders of 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), met 
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at Potsdam, Germany from July 17th, one day after the successful test, to August 2; this became 
known as the Potsdam Conference. The Allies – by winning the war, had the ability to re-shape 
Europe’s borders. Questions for the conference included: how to handle Germany, German-
Soviet-Polish lands and borders, and the deportation of Germans from various areas of Europe. 
The leaders agree that Germany would be fully de-militarized and cut into four zones of 
occupation, each controlled by one of the big three present at the conference and the addition of 
France.21 Other things were agreed upon such as treaties and setting up councils, this was all 
done out in the open, diplomatically, with translators. However, the most impactful thing came 
offhandedly, away from any recorders and without Truman’s translator; a private discussion 
between Truman and Stalin about the nuclear bomb.  While the whole conversation can never be 
known it was overheard in some aspects, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in his memoirs 
claims that Truman never used the term “atomic bomb,” only that they had a new bomb more 
destructive than any before.22  
The only bomb to have been exploded at this point was the Trinity test, so it was 
understandable for Truman to assume that the Soviets did not know the US had obtained a 
working bomb. It was naïve to assume that the Soviets new nothing about uranium and 
plutonium research being undertaken. Stalin had long known about the Manhattan Project, 
indeed there we multiple spies within the Manhattan project that would give information to the 
Soviet Union to help build their own bomb later.23  Stalin simply told Truman that he hoped they 
would use it and it would be successful, according to recounts. The day following Stalin and 
Truman’s discussion, the US and the UK declared the ‘Potsdam Proclamation’ against Japan 
promising utter destruction if they did not surrender. Again, the words ‘atomic bomb’ were not 
said.  
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Professor Michael D. Gordin from Princeton University, in his book “Red Cloud at 
Dawn,” proposes that the beating-around-the-bush style that Truman took, soured the 
relationship between the US and the USSR giving up the chance for any cooperation between 
East and West.24 Cemented by this is the fact that Stalin and Truman never met in person again.25 
Whether or not this is true cannot be proven, but it begs the question as to why Truman withheld 
information about the bomb so cryptically: to say that it was ‘destructive’ and there would be 
‘utter destruction’ seems odd if you consider the fact that in only 13 days the entire world would 
know about the atomic bomb; not in it’s entirety due to withholding facts about the bombings, 
but that it existed and its power was enormous.  Perhaps, the information needed to be kept 
secret so that if the first bomb did not work they could release a second one, as they did with 
Nagasaki. No great power of World War II was unfamiliar with the concept of nuclear fission, 
they had all researched it to some extent,26 so if Truman had announced that the “destruction” 
would be coming from a nuclear weapon, Japan may have taken it more seriously and possibly 
avoided the two horrors that would take place.  
The Only Time 
The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been the only two instances in history 
where nuclear weapons were used in warfare. Hiroshima was bombed on August 6th, 1945 by a 
bomb named “Little Boy,” that produced a yield of 13 kilotons27 killing 80,000 according to 
most sources28 but upwards to 140,000 in other sources, the level destruction is too extensive to 
ever have a clear picture.29 Truman broke the news to the world after the successful mission and 
warned the Japanese that if they did not surrender they would detonate a second bomb.30 
According to Stalin’s daughter, he went silent hearing the news, quietly withdrew to his, 
“champers, at which point he became ill.”31 On August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union told Japan that 
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their nations would be at war. Some have criticized this move as a chance to gain a seat at the 
table for when the war in the Pacific theater was over; the Soviet Union claimed it was following 
through on their promise to enter the Pacific theater 3 months after Germany’s surrender.32 After 
the bombing Japan’s cabinet was split 3-3 on surrender33 and did not. After 3 days of waiting, on 
August 9, 1945, the US dropped the bomb “Fat Man” on the Nagasaki, it yielded 22 kilotons and 
killed between 40,000 and 70,000.34 On August 14, 1945, Japan had accepted all terms of the 
surrender.  
The Reality of the Bomb  
The question then posited is: was dropping the bomb just? The traditional argument is 
that a land invasion would have killed more Japanese and Americans and only prolonged the 
war; the idea was firmly planted in the evidence of the loss of life seen at the invasion of 
Okinawa. Still, directly following the bombs and the revelations of its horror the United States 
press slammed the US for the use of such a horrifying weapon and decried the fate of humanity 
due to its existence.35   Here is a portion of chart taken from “Scientists and the Development of 
Nuclear Weapons,” by Lawrence Badash, to show the destruction of nuclear weapons. As 
mentioned before all estimates for death vary. 
 Hiroshima 
Nuclear 
Bomb 
Nagasaki 
Nuclear 
Bomb 
Tokyo-  1,667 tons of incendiary 
bombs dropped between May 9-10 , 
1945  
Population at the time 250,000 195,000 ? 
Dead 70-80,000 35-40,000 <100,000 
Wounded 70-80,000 35-40,000 <80,000 
Area Destroyed in 
Square Miles 
4.4 1.8 15.8 
 
The death toll for Tokyo took two days, the death tolls for Hiroshima and Nagasaki took 
only a few minutes. The damage of Tokyo was ruins, the damage of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
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was near flattening of all existing infrastructure and landscape in minutes. The injuries at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were novel and there was little information on how to treat them.  
Other cities were bombed in similar fashion to Tokyo but Hiroshima had not been. Yuki 
Takaka, a historian Hiroshima Peace Institute is recorded in the documentary, “Rouen to 
Hiroshima: The Battle of the Skies,” explaining this peculiarity:36  
It’s estimated that 80,000 people perished in a single instant and at the end of 1945 the 
number of victims rose to over 140,000. While a 100 or so Japanese cities had suffered 
bombardments since the month of January 1945, Hiroshima had been completely left out, 
ignored. So there had been a will to experiment. They’d been careful to reserve the city 
so as to be able to measure as precisely as possible the destructive power of the atomic 
bomb. 
 
Scientists had indeed chosen Hiroshima, as well as Niigata, and Kyoto as prime targets 
due to their industrial centers and the lack of previous US bombing.37 The bomb, according to 
US secret deliberations, was meant to be a psychological weapon, not just a physical one.38 
Looking at the three locations proposed by the military and scientists, Kyoto stands out as the 
most devastating target of all in terms of psychology. Kyoto was Japans capital for over 1000 
years, with much of its historical buildings and sites left unchanged, and contained innumerable 
cultural artifacts.39 Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson took this into consideration and crossed it 
off the list. Thus, this action can be viewed as an understanding of the bombs destructive power, 
and the need to use it carefully. It shows that the United States understood what this bomb was 
going to do. The questions then remains: if they knew its power should they have stilled used it 
at all?  
Aria Shunichiro is a Hiroshima atomic bomb survivor, explains what he saw, at the age 
of 12, when he walked closer to the city center after the bomb had dropped:40  
Their skin was bright red because they had all been burnt. They had their hands stretched 
out in front of them. […] thousands of them fleeing the city center and we, young school 
boys, found ourselves in the middle of these hoards of people […] I was confused 
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shocked terrified, it was their own skin that was pealing off and hanging down to the 
ground, they were holding it delicately in their hands because it must have been 
extremely painful […] they were coming from all sides and we were surrounded they 
advanced very slowly then dropped down to the ground, dead. One after the other. [ …] it 
was covered in crowds of [dead] bodies  
 
On the other side, Paul Warfield Tibbets IV, grandson of Paul Warfield Tibbets Jr. the pilot who 
dropped Little Boy on Hiroshima, recalls the words of his grandfather:41  
As my grandfather started to get older and we started to talk about his career he said Paul 
don’t miss this: ‘I never lost a night of sleep after that mission. We did the best job we 
could, to carry out the orders that the president of the United States gave us. Which we 
were convinced would lead to brining the war to an end as quickly as possible 
 
Thousands of Americans had died during the war and the President, Commander and 
Chief, had the means to end it. By doing so, he was saving many American lives; that was the 
US goal in World War II, to the end the war to protect their own. What Paul Tibbets Jr. believed 
was his reason to faithfully follow through with his orders, and it worked.  
 If it worked, than to many that is enough justification for a first time use. However, Yuki 
Takaka makes the argument that Truman’s claim that the bombed saved millions of lives by 
ending the war quicker was a myth. It was a myth said over and over until it was believed; the 
US needed this myth because they developed the bomb as a deterrent weapon and strategic tool. 
They needed to justify its use, if the US recognized its use was a war crime they would not be 
able to keep it. They would not risk losing a weapon that deterred active aggression by the Soviet 
Union.42  
We can never know which idea was true, was Hiroshima a test, was a way to end the war 
quicker, or was the justification created after the war. However, the US did do one more action 
that can be seen as a crime against the Japanese people. The US occupied Japan from 1945-1952. 
During that time the US army heavily censored the Japanese media, if did not allow any 
information regarding the atomic bombings to be published and those who did speak out were 
15 
 
jailed. Due to the censorship of information, the people had no understanding of the effects of 
radiation. As symptoms developed, people believed survivors were contagious and so separated 
themselves.43  For this reason, the survivors were called “Hibakusha,” literally bomb-effected 
people; they were discriminated against and forgotten. It was not until after the occupation of 
Japan ended that any medical funding was approved and even to this day they still face 
discrimination and misunderstanding.44  
The American Monopoly  
After the end of the war, it was apparent to everyone that the US had achieved a weapon 
of unprecedented destruction. What was more important was the revelation that the US was 
willing to use it, on any target. Whether or not the nuclear program was meant to create a 
deterrent weapon or not, it did. It created one of the greatest deterrent weapons in history.45  
While the Soviet Union was increasing money spent on their military, while the US was 
diminishing the number of its military personnel. The atomic bomb was expensive: the 
Manhattan Project had already taken 2 billion dollars, but trying to match the Soviet Union’s 
standing conventional army would have been more expensive.46 After World War II the US had 
the following advantages: 2/3rds of the worlds gold reserves, 3/4ths of all invested capital, ½ the 
worlds manufacturing ability, produced 1/3 of the worlds goods, and the gross national product 
was three times larger than the Soviet Union.47 Despite downsizing the military, the US was the 
world’s economic power and had the means to create more weapons. The US considered 
communism a continually threat but having a nuclear weapons “monopoly” gave the United 
States not only security but seeming control over world happenings. This security dis just 4 years 
later, when the Soviet Union attained its own nuclear bomb. 
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Chapter 3: The Arms Race 
Overview  
The Arms Race is a period during the Cold War in which the United States of America 
(US), the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), and their respective allies rapidly produced 
nuclear weapons and nuclear technology in an effort to remain superior to the other powers. The 
Arms Race period starts in 1945, the year the United States dropped two nuclear bombs on 
Japan. The race slowed down in 1963 when the “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the 
Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater” (abbreviated as ‘Partial Test Ban Treaty’ or 
PTBT) was signed by the United Kingdom (UK), the US, and the USSR1. It did not end testing 
of nuclear weapons underground. However, it was the first treaty written with the intent to 
purposefully end the arms race; as stated in the treaty: “Proclaiming as their principle aim […] 
put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to production and testing of all 
kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons.”2 A more impactful end comes in 1970 when the 
“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” (NPT) comes into effect.3  
Going Nuclear   
Key developments of the arms race include when each nuclear power had their first 
successful bomb test, also know as “going nuclear.” The nations that were nuclear powers at the 
end of the Arms Race were: The US, the USSR, the UK, France, and China.4 
  The American monopoly over nuclear weapons was broken when the USSR went 
nuclear with its first successful bomb test on August 29, 1949. Named RDS-1, codenamed Joe 1 
by the US, it was dropped on Semipalatinsk Test Site (Semipalatinsk-1) in modern day 
Kazakhstan, with a yield of 20 kilotons.5 The US had created a department named Office of 
Atomic Energy-1 (AFOAT-1) within the Air Force. The department was charged with running 
the US’ Atomic Energy Detection System, a system designed to maintain surveillance of any 
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nuclear weapon related activity.6 This system detected the USSR’s first atomic bomb,7 a US 
specially equipped air craft picked up radioactive particles that, after analysis, proved to be 
fission fragments.8  
The results went to the National Security Council (NSC) and where given to the President 
Truman and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on September 9th.9 However, 
AFOAT-1 was kept on an extreme need-to-know basis10 this caused miscommunications within 
different levels of bureaucracy; the rest of the CIA did not hear of the discovery and sent a 
message to Truman on September 20th, declaring that the USSR would not be able to go nuclear 
until the mid 1950s.11 During this stretch of time Truman and other high level officials who 
knew about AFOAT-1’s discovery where questioning whether or not to go public with the 
information.12 The CIA report proved the varying levels of secrecy surrounding the discussion of 
nuclear weapons and had to be weighed into the decision of releasing the information or not. On 
September 23rd Truman shared the information with his cabinet and took a poll on whether to 
announce the findings; all but two cabinet members were in favor of release.13 Directly following 
the cabinet meeting the news was delivered via a written memo to White House press 
correspondents; the same day the UK also announced the USSR’s successful test of a nuclear 
weapon.  The USSR did not conduct another nuclear test until September 24, 1951 in the same 
location with a yield of 30 kilotons.14  
The UK went nuclear with its successful detonation of an atomic device, codenamed 
Operation Hurricane, in Monte Bellow Islands in Oceania, on October 3, 1952,15 with a yield of 
25 kilotons.16  However, the UK did not develop its first fully usable nuclear weapon until 
November 1953, labeled Blue Danube, and did not have a fully operational deliver squadron 
until 1956.17 France joined the nuclear powers on February 13, 1960 with a successful test of a 
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nuclear aerial bomb, named Gerboise Bleue at Reggane, Algeria.18 The bomb yielded 70 
kilotons,19 the largest yield of a first atomic test, surpassing US’s first atomic bomb Trinity’s 20 
kilotons yield.  
China’s nuclear testing had a large entanglement with its foreign relations with the 
USSR. In 1961, the US Department of the Air Force forecast that China would become a nuclear 
power within 10 years; however, without USSR support, China would be unable to reach nuclear 
capability within that time frame. It also warned that in the meantime the USSR would supply 
China with nuclear weapons, those weapons would remain under the control of the USSR but the 
US would still have to face a monolith of “Sino-Soviet bloc” nuclear weapons.20 In 1960 the 
USSR’s support of China’s nuclear development program abruptly broke off. However, contrary 
to the US Air Force’s initial assessment China was still able to successfully go nuclear with its 
first successful test, named 596, on October 16, 1964 at Lop Nur, Xinjian.21  After the successful 
test Chinese officials recognize that the program would not have been successful without prior 
USSR help, despite the cutting of ties, in 1960.22  
The Hydrogen Bomb  
The bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as all the initial tests conducted by 
the nuclear states were all atomic bombs (A-bombs) the mechanism that used fission energy and 
a chain reaction. Atomic bombs generally yield between than 100 kilotons, with the exception of 
the US’ Ivy King, the largest fission type bomb every exploded with a yield of 500 kilotons.23 
The next wave of testing weapons was the introduction of the hydrogen bomb (H-bombs) 
its mechanism of action is a fusion reaction which had the capability to produce significantly 
higher yields once the mechanism was discovered.24 Thus, testing and producing the H-bomb 
was the next frontier of the arms race. The US and USSR far outpaced other nuclear states in the 
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Arms Race when in comes to the H-bomb. The British tested their first atomic device in October 
of 1952 while in November of 1952 the US detonated its first H-bomb.25  
Ivy Mike was the first successful test of any hydrogen based bomb, denoted on 
November 1, 1952.26 Scientists feared that the bomb could cause a submarine landslide and 
tsunami; thus, the test was conducted by remote control. Ivy Mike was detonated on surface level 
at Elugelab Island located in the Pacific Ocean’s Enewetak Atoll. The first true H-bomb yielded 
10.4 megatons, produced a mushroom cloud up 100,000 feet high, and left a crater 1 mile in 
diameter and 200 feet in depth.27 The island of Elugelab no longer existed after the explosion, 
showing the immense destruction that new H-bombs had the potential to cause.  
 
 
The largest detonation of an A-bomb yielded 500 kilotons, in comparison to the first H-
bomb’s 10.4 megaton yield, it was clear that to keep up in the arms race the nuclear powers 
would need to quickly build up H-bomb stockpiles rather than the earlier A-bombs. 
The USSR’s first test of the H-bomb was labeled RDS-6, their fourth nuclear weapon 
tested28, codenamed Joe 4 by the US. It was tested on August 12, 1953 at Semipalatinsky-1; it 
Before test of H-bomb Ivy Mike at Elugelab 
Island Source: Brookings Institution 
After the test with Eluglab destroyed  
Source: Brookings Institution 
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was the first successful test of an H-bomb detonated in the air 29 and yielded 400 kilotons.30 The 
first “true” H- bomb test, the same mechanism of action employed by the US’, a 2-stage fusion, 
exploded by the USSR was on November 22nd, 1955 and yielded 1.5 megatons.31 All 5 nuclear 
powers held an H-bomb weapon by the end of the 1960s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Magnitude of the Race 
By 1953 the United States had 832 nuclear weapons; by 1955 the US had 2,280 weapons, 
yet only air bombers to deliver them;34 the same method used to bomb Hiroshima, the flight had 
taken 6 hours and 30 minutes to make it from the Marianna Islands to the Japanese mainland.35 
During the time the USSR was conducting Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Tests, the 
missiles would have the capability to deliver a nuclear weapon onto the US mainland within 30 
minutes.36 In 1957 they successfully tested a small ICBM, then only 2 months later launched 
their first space satellite, giving the US a reason to fear their IBCM program as more advanced 
than it actually was, later called the “missile gap.” The IBCMs being tested by the USSR did not 
fully have the capability to deliver the bombs at that time.37   
The USSR tested the limits of nuclear weapons by attempting to make a 100 megaton 
weapon; a 50/50 combo of fission and fusion technology with 3 stages.38 The bomb was labeled 
RDS-220, known as the “Tsar Bomba” and various other names. The production of the bomb 
was hasty and it weighed 27 tons and was 2 meters wide and 8 meters long; the plane designed to 
carry it, TU-16 badger, had to be outfitted.39 The bomb was carried and released via parachute, to 
Country First Atomic 
Test 32 
First Hydrogen 
Bomb Test 33 
United States 1945 1952 
Russia 1949 1953 
United Kingdom 1952 1957 
France 1960 1968 
China 1964 1967 
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give the piolet time to escape the main blast zone.40 It had a yield of 50 megatons,41 the cloud 
reached up 45 miles high reaching earth’s mesosphere42 despite being detonated in the air it set 
off earthquake seismic detectors across the entire world.43 If such a bomb were detonated, it 
would have up to a 15 mile radius of complete devastation with another 10 miles of severe 
damage.44 At the test site, window panes were partially broken 550 miles out. In comparison, the 
blast zone of Hiroshima’s bomb was 1.4 mile radius of total devastation, three miles of severe 
damage, and windows broken out to 12 miles.45 With the weight of the bomb, its size, the need to 
outfit the plane itself, it was unlikely to be an effective weapon, only one such bomb was ever 
made and ever exploded.  
Despite that possibly comforting fact, the USSR proved that with technology a blast of 50 
megatons was possible. The PTBT treaty to stop all atmospheric, oceanic, and spaces tests when 
into effect in 1963, despite an effort to end the testing of nuclear weapons it simply lead to 700 
underground tests by the US and 500 underground tests from the USSR to happen out of the 
public eye for 20 years.46  
By the end of the Cold War the USSR had tested 715 bombs with a combined yield of 
452 megatons; the US had detonated 1,089 nuclear bombs with a combined yield of 141 
megatons. The other 3 nuclear states paled in comparison the UK exploded 42, France 182, and 
China 35.47 Below is a map of all the nuclear detonations from 1945-2007.48 
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The Human Effects 
All of the events shown on the map above did not happen in a vacuum: the nuclear tests 
affected out environment, ecosystem, and tragically many lives. Illustrated prior, was the island 
of Elugelab being wiped off the map. Eluglab was part of the Marshall Islands, the US used these 
islands for 67 nuclear tests.49 The Marshall Islands were not uninhabited places the US chose to 
use, they were home to the Marshallese people. This group of people came from Southeast Asia 
around 2000 years ago, they believe their land belongs to everyone via their clan, called bwj.50 
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Yet, the US simply moved them out of the way; one example is the expulsion of the Marshallese 
people from Bikini Atoll to Rongerik Atoll.51 The US did so without much thought, as Tomaki 
Juda, a child at the time, explains in an interview:52  
We spent two years there. 
Rongerik was like a desert: there were no coconut drinks; the fish around its waters were 
contaminated; etc…And the people on Rongerik were starving to death. One time, one of 
our grandmothers died of hunger. Sometime later, however, a man [a researcher] came 
from the University of Hawaii. He [and his team] came and ran some experiments and 
tests, then called Kwajalein defense authorities to send medications and food as soon as 
possible to Rongerik Atoll. After some time, another group decision was reached to move 
us from Rongerik Atoll to Kwajalein  
 
The people were then moved to Kwajalein to Kili Island, another poor decision, he continues to 
tell his story:53  
So Kili is a place where it is quite difficult to…[live]. The residents suffered hunger 
again. I was the mayor during the famine. I […] decided later to run for the mayoral seat 
to see if I could do something to ease the hunger—I started with the High Commissioner 
for the US Territory through the United Nations-Justice of Council and asked for 
provisionary help […] So they responded and brought C-rations […]The C-rations helped 
ease the hunger at that time of famine. However, there wasn’t enough financial assistance 
[…] The Americans did not give money to the people of Bikini, [not even] pocket money 
that could enable them to buy them food from the stores. They had to live only on C-
rations. 
 
Still more injustice came when the US detonated a 15 megaton bomb on Bikini and 
unpredicted winds sent lethal doses of radioactive fall out to Rongelap Atoll, inducing an 
emergency evacuation of the natives. During the same incident, a Japanese fishing boat was near 
the waters and crew members later became sick, one died, and the fish caught were all 
contaminated.54  
 The Soviet Union also conducted tests with only bare minimum consideration of people’s 
livelihoods. In fact, the USSR’s disregard was worse in some cases, as the USSR often 
disregarded health concerns within its industries, but the accelerated need during the Arms Race 
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made it worse for those in the nuclear industry.55  The main testing site for USSR nuclear tests 
was Semipalainski-1, named for the town that laid 100 miles from the testing site, and is apart of 
modern day Kazakhstan; it was where Joe-1 was detonated.56 In total, 456 tests were detonated at 
this site. During this time around 500,000 people were exposed to radiation, and around 10,000 
of them experienced symptoms such as: hair loss, miscarriage, cancer, infant mortality, cancer, 
skin disorders, depressions, and suicide.57 Information about health effects was no distributed, 
the cause of the heath issues being related to radiation was denied, and there were no serious 
investigations until 1989.58 
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Chapter 4: The Cuban Missile Crisis  
Background and the USSR’s Decision  
John F. Kennedy in his presidential race stressed the “missile gap,” The idea that the 
USSR was advancing far more capable missiles than the US; this turned out to be false. Nikita 
Khrushchev, leader of the USSR between 1953-1964, knew that this missile gap idea was exactly 
the opposite: the USSR lagged far behind in creating ICBMs.1 The US had missiles located 
throughout NATO nations2 and Khrushchev questioned, in private, why should the US be 
allowed to put weapons in locations that could reach USSR homeland, but not the other way 
around.3 This idea set an ideological foundation for the beginnings of the Cuban Missile Crisis  
The ties between the USSR and Cuba, led by Fidel Castro, were tightknit, while the 
tensions between the US and Cuba where immense. During the early 1960s the US was running 
a full scale campaign against Cuba: in 1961 the US had been defeated at the Bay of Pigs, an 
invasion planed by the US, using US-trained, Cuban anti-revolutionaries in an attempt to 
overtake the country;4 later that year Operation Mongoose was designed to undermine the Castro 
regime; USSR and Cuban officials discovered that the US sent Miami-based deployments of 
reconnaissance and sabotage teams into Cuba; the US placed sanctions on Cuba’s economy and a 
full embargo on trade with Cuba; the US managed to convince 15 other Latin American nations 
to break diplomatic relations with Cuba.5 Understandably the USSR and Cuba feared an 
eventual, full-scale invasion by the US.  
The concept of placing weapons in reach of the US to break the double-standard and the 
fear of tensions between the US and Cuban escalating, in junction lead to the USSR’s decision to 
deploy forces to Cuban soil.6 In secrecy, the USSR sent IRBMs, MRBMS, tactical nuclear 
weapons, fighter air craft, navy ships, light bombers, cruise missiles, and Soviet military troops.7 
The sheer size of the force being sent to Cuban shows that it was most likely a set up of a lasting 
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strategic point against the US, with the US hostility towards Cuba making it the perfect location. 
The USSR’s Ministry of Defense approved formal orders to deploy its forces to Cuba on June 
10, 1962.8 
The 13 Day Crisis 
On October 14 a US Aircraft flying over Cuba identified the missile sites.9 This news was 
relayed to President Kennedy on October 16, the start of the so called “13 Days;” an ad-hoc 
group formed quickly to discuss the unfolding events. The group would later come to be known 
as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Excomm). All members agreed 
that the US could not remain idle in this situation, but they disagreed on which route the US 
should take in its response — a military response or a diplomatic response.10 On October 17,after 
two Excomm meetings, a draft was written that presented the conclusions of the meetings and 
included the possible courses of action:11 
Track A– Political Action, pressure and warning, followed by a military strike if 
satisfaction is no received 
Track B– A military strike without prior warning pressure or action, accompanied by 
messages making clear the limited nature of this action 
Track C– Political Action, pressure and warning, followed by a total naval blockade, 
under the authority of the Rio Pact and either Congressional Declaration of War on Cuba 
or the Cuban Resolution of the 87th Congress  
Track D– Full-scale invasion, to “take Cuba away from Castro”. 
 
On October 18 Kennedy and Andrei Gromyko, the USSR’s Foreign Affairs Minister met; 
he assured Kennedy that the forces in Cuba were meant solely for Cuba’s defense. He also 
mentioned that this defense is necessary due to the US “pestering” a small country. Kennedy 
does not disclose that the US knows about the missiles themselves and instead reads part of an 
earlier statement, made on September 4, waring the USSR against sending any offensive 
weapons to Cuba, and the discussion on the situation ends there. During that day the Excomm 
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deliberations continue and the course of action agreed upon is a blockade of Cuba; multiple 
small governmental groups are established to work on multiple facets the blockade would 
entail.12  
A blockade is considered an act of war by multiple treaties and court cases. A blockade 
therefore is subject to the laws of warfare; an unannounced blockade is unlawful. With the 
serious implications of war a decision was reached on October 20 to go through with the plan13 
for a “quarantine” of Cuba, allowing the US to avoid an act of war and also to receive support 
from International Organizations.14 The secrecy surrounding the situation was slipping and the 
media caught the story. On October 21 the President made personal phone calls to journalists at 
the New York Times, Washington Post, and, via a 3rd party, the New York Herald Tribune. All 
three media outlets agreed to hold the story.15  
The following day, October 22, President Kennedy addressed the Nation and American 
diplomats serving abroad alerted foreign ministers and heads of states about of the situation.16 
The speech used strong accusations against the USSR, to show to the world that the US would 
not back down:17  
By the presence of these, large, and long range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden 
mass destruction constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the 
Americas in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this 
nation and hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th congress, the charter of the United 
Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4th and 13th , this 
action also contradicts the repeated reassurances of Soviet spokesmen both publicly and 
privately delivered, that the arms build up in Cuba would retain its original defense 
character. 
 
During the period of the quarantine one Soviet ship did not divert its path and continued 
on to Cuba, directly defying the US quarantine. The US military rapidly increased its readiness 
level for war (see DEFCON below). The resolution to the crisis involved a series of private 
letters back and forth between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Khrushchev knew the situation was 
34 
 
rapidly deteriorating, and it was not in his favor; through secret negotiations Khrushchev agreed 
to remove all forces from Cuba if the US removed any and all US missiles located in Turkey.18 
On October 28 Khrushchev publically announced, on Radio Moscow, that he was removing all 
missiles from Cuba, ending the 13 day crisis.19    
The Brink of War (DEFCON) 
The US military is always under one of five Defense Readiness Condition States 
(DEFCON), a system that states the level of alertness that the military must be set at in relation 
to current and unfolding events.20 DEFCON 5 is the readiness of the military at all times, 
essential “normal”.  DEFCON 1 is maximum readiness and would be declared when a nuclear 
war is considered imminent.  During the Cold War different parts of the military were set at 
different levels, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was usually set at DEFCON 4.21 
However, DEFCON becomes alarming when the change is sudden, involves large 
sections of the military, and is world wide. Worldwide changes in US military DEFCON have 
happened at only 4 times.22 The first event being more of an ‘accident’ in which Secretary of 
Defense Thomas Gates wanted to low-key test the new system in response to a minor 
intelligence report. The order went to DEFCON 3 and was instituted worldwide within a day 
catching the attention of the media, it was quickly reverted back to DEFCON 5.  
The first true and meaningful instance of using the DEFCON system was during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, on October 24, two days after Kennedy addresses the nation the Strategic 
Air Command was placed on DEFCON 2, one step below imminent nuclear warfare and all other 
forces were ordered to DEFCON 3.23 While the name wasn’t known the preparation of military 
action was clear, Soviet Intelligence alerted Khrushchev on October 26 that a US Air Strike on 
Cuba could be imminent. On October 27 Fidel Castro sent a personal message to Khrushchev 
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stating he believed a US invasion of Cuba could happen within 24-72 hours.24 The sheer military 
confrontation was immense, and the US did not act light handedly. The severity of the other 
three world wide DEFCONs increases prove this point: the Gulf War, the Yom Kippur War, and 
the September 11, 2001 attacks.25 Knowing this, in combination with proposed Tracks C and D 
of the Excomm course of actions, proves how closely the Cold War super powers came to full 
nuclear war.
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Chapter 5: Arms Limitations 
The Necessity  
The goal of restricting nuclear weapons had arose in 1946 with the “Baruch Plan” 
proposed at the United Nation (UN), it was not amicable to either super power and failed to be 
implemented. The failure left the idea of full-scale successful arms control out of view for nearly 
a decade.1 However, non-official discussions between the US, UK, and USSR, to specifically 
ban the testing of nuclear weapons began in the early 1950s.  Despite this, the issue was not 
addressed in any formal agreement until 1963 and a full-scale ban was not reached until 1996.2  
Nuclear weapons are a deterrent weapon, they are not meant for battles, but instead to 
end wars in their entirety. No state would be willing to give up such powerful weapons; nor 
would any state want to waiver in their conviction to use them, if necessary.3 
 As shown in Chapter 2, the Arms Race had produced more weapons than could ever be 
needed, while in the process devastating entire ecosystems, damaging the environment, 
destroying peoples livelihoods, and causing serious illnesses to those living near testing sites, 
and not admitting that the testing had caused the illnesses.  
It became increasingly clear that unlimited testing would become harmful; negotiations 
had to be agreed upon by the nuclear powers. No state would act alone during the stalemate of 
the Cold War as it would mean wavering in strategic defenses; no agreement, meant no change, 
at least between the US and USSR.  
Aside from nuclear weapons testing, by the 1960s nuclear delivery system technology 
was advancing rapidly. Both the US and USSR were testing Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs) , with the US having the 10 “Atlas missiles” and the USSR having around half that,4 of 
particular concern for the USSR, the US had intermediate range missiles (IRBMs) located in 
Norther Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries throughout Europe that could 
38 
 
effectively reach the USSR’s territory at any time. The development of operational Submarine 
Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) was also in full swing.5 Testing bans would not be enough, 
restrictions on non-peaceful nuclear technology developments, the end to the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, a structured framework, and official oversight of nuclear arms control were all 
necessary to prevent the possible disaster of a nuclear war.    
Limiting and Banning Testing  
The beginning of nuclear testing bans began with the USSR’s 1958 decision to halt 
nuclear testing, so long as the other nuclear powers did as well; the moratorium was met with 
great hesitancy from both the US and UK.6 Due to public outcry over pollution a convention of 
scientific experts from eight nations gathered at Geneva to discuss on-site testing. With the idea 
of inspection looming over their heads and the disagreements over what type of testing to stop, 
the USSR and US both rapidly conducted large scale nuclear tests and then agreed to halt further 
testing for an indefinite time,7 thus also halting the threats of inspection. At this time, during the 
President Eisenhower administration, the fear of a so called “missile gap” emerged. It was 
thought that the USSR’s missiles were much more advanced and much more numerous than 
those of the US. John F Kennedy used this idea on his campaign trail, blaming President 
Eisenhower for creating the missile gap due to the 1958 moratorium.8 The missile gap idea was 
factually wrong,9 the USSR was focused on IRBMs and middle-range ballistic missiles 
(MRBMs),10 rather than ICBMs. However, despite the fact that the ICBM missile gap idea was 
false, the IRBMs and MRBMs could reach the US State of Alaska via the eastern most part of 
the USSR’s territory, and the contiguous 48 states via Cuba, giving rise to the 1962 Cuban 
Missile Crisis discussed in the previous chapter.  
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Described in Chapter 2, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 was the first 
international negotiation with the aim to “put an end to the armaments race.”11 It banned all 
testing in the ocean, in the air, and in space.12 Its origin lay in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the shock 
factor of the situation made the two sides quickly turn back to diplomatic avenues. With the help 
of the UK, the US and USSR agreed to the PTBT;13 however, the other two nuclear powers of 
the time, France and China, did not sign onto the treaty.14 
The next attempt to further restrict the testing of nuclear weapons came with the “Treaty 
on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,” (also known as Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty and TTBT) in 1974 between the US and the USSR. The treaty directly refers back to the 
PTBT in its opening, it states that the previous treaty was an attempt “to achieve the 
discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons of all time, and to continue 
negotiations…” it further claims that signing the TTBT, “would contribute to the achievements 
of these objectives.15 Its main point was to limit the size of underground test explosions to 150 
kilotons. Within Article 1, it also states that the two powers will continue negotiations on 
underground testing.  
Despite these early efforts, a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapons testing would 
not be signed until 1996, after the Cold War had ended.  
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Technology 
 Attempts to ban the proliferation of new nuclear weapons also appeared very early on. 
Talks of limiting nuclear technology to solely peaceful use began in 1946, 3 years before the 
USSR had successfully detonated its first bomb. The negotiations hoped to create a system in 
which nuclear technology could be used by all states for peaceful means, with safeguards to 
protect against weaponry; the program failed and disbanded in 1949.16 
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The next push to end the proliferation came in November 1953 when the United Nations 
General Assembly proposed that the Disarmament Commission establish a sub-commission for 
which the nuclear powers could meet to discuss the goal of non-proliferation.17 Following this 
proposal President Eisenhower gave a speech before United Nations in December of 1953, now 
famously called the “Atoms for Peace” speech.  In his speech, he begins by stressing the 
disasters of a nuclear war. He explains that the technology to develop nuclear weapons is no 
longer truly a secret to the powerful nations of the world, which could lead to dangerous 
consequences. He also claims the US will never demand that the USSR give up what is rightfully 
theirs; rather, he stated the US’ aim in the discussion over non-proliferation was to building 
bridges between the two states, not further the divide. 
Eisenhower’s desire for the end of nuclear weapons is shown emphatically in his final 
words to the UN:18  
To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you, and 
therefore before the world, its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma--to 
devote its entire heart and mind to finding the way by which the miraculous inventiveness 
of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life. 
 
His proposal led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to 
both promote and control nuclear technology.19  Though this and the frame work of the UN non-
proliferation was negotiated starting in 1957 and went through the 1960s, culminating in the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  
The NPT opened in 1968 for signatures and went into effect in 1970. A totally of 93 
states signed the NPT between 1968-1970; all states wishing to join after signatures closed could 
accede to the treaty; 98 States have done so, including the contested state of Palestine.20 In 2003 
the Peoples Republic of Korean (North Korea) withdrew from the treaty, the only state to have 
done so.21 The treaty contains 11 articles. A summary of the treaty is as follows: no nuclear state 
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will help, in any way, any non-nuclear state obtain nuclear weapons; no non-nuclear state will 
make an effort to obtain nuclear weapons; all non-nuclear states accept the safe-guards set forth 
by the IAEA when conducting nuclear power for peaceful purposes; no part of the treaty will 
prohibit the research of nuclear power for peaceful purposes; each nuclear state may assist all 
other states with the exchange of materials and technology for peaceful means under 
international oversight and guidelines; the treaty will undergo review every five years; after 25 
years the treaty will be reviewed to see if it should continue to be enforced.22  
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks   
The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks were two formal discussions between the US and 
USSR; SALT I took place from 1969-1972, while SALT II took place from 1972-1979.  
SALT I took place with the backdrop of the Vietnam War, the remaining tension over the 
Sino-Soviet split, the cooling of tensions between East Germany and West Germany, known as 
the Ostpolitik, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The talks of SALT I focused on defining under what 
parameters agreements could be made in, discarding non-essential details and finally 
compromising to some degree to obtain successful results.23  
The US and USSR’s greatest disagreements concerned delivery systems and missiles; 
this discussion was crucial following the uncertainty of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The USSR 
wanted to include all US weapon delivery systems including: long-range bombers, tactical 
bombers, any nuclear-armed aircraft located in Europe, and nuclear-armed ships in all waters 
adjacent to Soviet soil. These latter provisions were unacceptable to the US and had to be 
dropped if any formal agreement wanted to be achieved. The largest issue were ballistic missiles 
(see chart), the differing types of missile capabilities, and their locations. As the talks reached 
their last session the US and USSR agreed on the “Limitation on Anti-Ballistic Missile systems,” 
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or the AMB Treaty. The treaty allows for a certain number of missiles, in only certain areas, with 
specific ranges;24 in effect, it was a preventive measure to prevent a full-scale missile arms race. 
The treaty only mentions ICBMs by name but includes what it calls “strategic missiles.”25 Due to 
possible confusion two further measures were put into place the “Interim Agreement between the 
[US] and the [USSR] on certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Defensive 
Arms,” this added SLBMs to the treaties “strategic missiles” definition.26 A second document 
was then signed called the, “Protocol to the Interim Agreement Between the [US] and [USSR] on 
Certain Measure with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.” This second 
document was essentially a revision to the first, it specifically limited the number of SLBMs for 
each state and that new developments can only be to replace older systems.27  
SALT II took place one month after the interim agreement. SALT II took on more 
restraints than SALT I did, it addressed the numbers of ICBM, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and 
ASBM. It required a dismantling of systems if they exceeded the proscribed limits. Bans on 
testing and development of new ICBMs (except for one on each side), building new fixed 
launchers for ICBMS, converting light ICBM launchers to heavy launchers, heavy mobile 
ICBMs, heavy SLBMs, heavy ASBMs, surface ship missile launchers, launching from the sea 
bed, and delivery systems in earth’s orbit. The treaty was to remain in effect until 1985.28 
President Reagan’s Administration did not ratify the treaty; however, it did follow through with 
the terms of the Treaty.29 
 
Main Missiles Under Question during the 1960s and 70s. Sources: 30 31 32 
Acronym Type Notes 
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic 
missile  
Part of the so false "missile gap"  
Considered Strategic  
MRBM  Medium Range Ballistic 
Missile  
1 of 2 USSRs main focus on ballistic missile 
development  
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IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic 
Missile 
Involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis 
of 2 USSRs main focus on ballistic missile development 
SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic 
Missile  
Considered Strategic 
ASBM Air to Surface Ballistic 
Missile  
 
 
The Unenforceable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
A ban on all testing was proposed and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
in 1996, called the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), it has been signed by 183 states and 
ratified by 166. However, to fully go into force 44 designated “nuclear capable” states must sign 
and ratify the treaty. Of those 44, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have not signed the treaty and 
eight states have not ratified it.33 The United States signed the treaty under President George H. 
W. Bush but the US Senate refused to advice and consent to the treaty in 1999. President Barak 
Obama in 2009 stated he would call for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratify the treaty 
but ultimately failed; as of 2017 the US has still not ratified the CTBT.34 Currently, nuclear 
weapons are still overseen by the IAEA and also the United Nations Office for Disarmament 
Affairs (UNODA). However, without the full cooperation of all nuclear states, no world wide 
enforceable treaty can be reached, as shown in the case of the CTBT.
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Chapter 6: Dissolution of the Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union’s fall from power was almost entirely 
political rather than revolutionary. Mikhail Gorbachev became 
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist 
party, the de facto head of state for the USSR, as leader of the 
Soviet Union he introduced many reforms. One of these reforms 
would lead to the USSR’s demise — the introduction of 
Presidency and multiple political parties in the USSR inevitably 
leading to full democratization.2 A coup of political hardliners, 
the Soviet Military, and the KGB attempted a coup de ta on 
Gorbachev’s government to reverse the liberalization;3 the coup 
failed but ultimately took substantial power away from 
Gorbachev.  
The republics of the USSR in 1989 and 1990 started to declare sovereignty, self-governance 
within the USSR, or independence from the USSR as a whole. The table shows dates, all republics 
decaled in 1990 except for Azerbaijan which declared in 1989.4  
In December of 1991 the larger sovereign republics of Russia, led by Yelstin, Ukraine, Belarus, 
and Kazakhstan created the Commonwealth of Independent States;5 this creation ended the government of 
the Soviet Union.  On December 25th 1991 Gorbachev stepped down from his position as leader of the 
USSR and Yelstin stepped up as President of the new state, Russia.6  
The USSR’s nuclear arsenal was located mainly in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. 
The US wanted only one state to remain a nuclear power and the best course of action, in their view, was 
to return all nuclear weapons to Russia, the most stable of the new founded governments. Belarus obliged, 
Kazakhstan took a stance on being nuclear free, but Ukraine wanted to retain its weapons.7 Ukraine 
wanted to insure that it would remain independent from Russia. The US feared that if the nuclear weapons 
were not returned to Russia they would be in the hands of the new unstable Ukrainian government. 
Republic Type Date  
Azerbaijan sovereignty Sep 23 
(1989) 
Georgia sovereignty March 9 
Lithuania independence  March 11 
Estonia independence March 30 
Latvia independence May 4 
Russia sovereignty June 11 
Uzbekistan sovereignty June 20 
Moldova sovereignty June 23 
Ukraine sovereignty July 16 
Belorussia 
(Belarus)  
sovereignty July 27  
Turkmenistan sovereignty August 22 
Tajikistan sovereignty August 25 
Armenia independence August 23 
Kazakhstan sovereignty October 25 
Kirgizia 
(Kyrgyzstan) 
sovereignty December 
12  
1  
47 
 
Through trilateral discussions between the US, Russia, and Ukraine, in 1993-1994 Ukraine agreed to 
transfer all nuclear weapons to Russia in exchange for material to create nuclear energy reactors.8 The 
dissolution of the USSR and the peaceful transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia mark the end of the Cold 
War.
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Conclusion  
The horrors that nuclear war can cause to human lives were shown in the devastated 
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the story of the Hibakusha; the destruction of the 
environment is shown in the contamination of the Marshall Islands; the speed at which a 
situation can devolve into nuclear war was seen in the 13 days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. These 
events may be in the past, but the reality of nuclear weapons is ever present.  
Today nine states currently possess nuclear weapons. The United States, Russia, United 
Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. Another twenty three states 
are in nuclear alliances with those powers: Albania, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech, 
Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, and Spain.1 As of 2016 the current 
nuclear stockpile is about 15,350 warheads; the number of nuclear warheads peaked in 1986 at 
around 70,300 (2).2 
Country Year of  
First Test3 
First H Bomb4 Number of 
Warheads 
20165 
United States 1945 1952 7,000 
Russia 1949 1953 7,300 
United 
Kingdom 
1952 1957 215 
France 1960 1968 330 
China 1964 1967 260 
India 1974 1998 possible 100-120 
Pakistan 1998  110-130 
Israel ?  80 
North Korea 2006 (4)  Less than 10 
Total   ~ 15,350 
 
These states are fraught with turmoil. In 2017, the main issue in focus is North Korea 
(DPRK) they have continued to conduct nuclear weapon and missile tests despite condemnations 
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and sanctions of the international community. All of the DPRK’s nuclear missile tests have 
failed6 to some this comes as a relief; however, we have seen that the USSR and China both went 
nuclear far sooner than any intelligence agencies had predicted. Today our ability to track and 
observe the DPRK’s nuclear program is much more sophisticated, but if we want to be proactive, 
we cannot count on predictions as to when the DPRK will or will not obtain working ballistic 
missiles  
If the DPRK puts working nuclear missiles at the heavily guarded 49th parallel, the agreed 
split between North and South Korea at the end of the Korean War, will another situation like the 
Cuban Missile Crisis emerge? The boarder is staffed with US Military personal and missiles in 
such a location would threaten our close allies, South Korea and Japan. If such a situation does 
develop it is important to recall the past, the Cuban Missile Crisis was everted due to two level 
headed Heads of State, Nikita Khrushchev and John F Kennedy. Kennedy did not directly head 
to war first, he tried to specifically avoid war by “quarantining” Cuba instead of “blockading” it. 
He used a show of force and personal secret negotiations between the two of them, to end the 
crisis. It is important for the world to ask, if this same situation happened between Kim Jog-un 
and Donald Trump, would we still be able to avoid nuclear war?
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